Public Land & Resources Law Review
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2018-2019

Article 24

4-23-2019

Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Barnhardt
Bradley E. Tinker
University of Montana, bradley.tinker@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Cultural Heritage Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law
Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Land Use
Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Property Law
and Real Estate Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Tinker, Bradley E. (2019) "Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Barnhardt," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol.
0 , Article 24.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss9/24

This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Maralex Resources Inc. v. Barnhardt, 913 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2019)
Bradley E. Tinker
In Maralex Resources v. Barnhardt, Maralex and property owners
brought an action to protect private property from BLM inspections of oil
and gas lease sites. The Tenth Circuit looked at the plain meaning of a
congressional statute and held in favor of Maralex, finding that BLM
lacked authority to require a private landowner to provide BLM with a key
to inspect wells of their property. The Tenth Circuit held BLM has the
authority to conduct inspections without prior notice on private property
lease sites; however, it is required to contact the property owner for
permission before entering the property.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Maralex Resources Inc. v. Barnhardt, both property owners and
lessees challenged the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado decision allowing the United States Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) to freely access oil and gas lease sites on private
property, and moved for a judicial review of the decision under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).1 Several parties compromised the
plaintiffs in this case, including Maralex, and families: the O’Hares; the
Kenners; and the Rowses (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).2 The land is owned
by the Southern Ute Tribe (the “Tribe”) and the three families of
Plaintiffs.3 Plaintiffs brought this action against the Secretary of the
Interior, the United States Department of the Interior, and the United States
(collectively, “Defendants”).4 The central issue of the case was whether
BLM has the authority to access wells located on private property at will.5
Plaintiffs argued BLM lacked the authority to freely conduct inspections
of wells on private property because of congressional statutes and
regulations protecting private property.6
The Tenth Circuit interpreted the authority of BLM to inspect oil
and gas wells located on private land under the Federal Oil and Gas
Royalty Management Act of 1982 (“FOGRMA”) and supporting
regulations.7 Under FOGRMA, BLM has the authority to inspect oil and
gas wells on federal and tribal land.8 However, FOGRMA is silent on
BLM’s authority to access lease sites on private land, and therefore
includes some inherent ambiguity about BLM access to private land.9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

913 F.3d 1189, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1189, 1201.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The property at issue in this case is a 320-acre parcel of land in
southwest Colorado, in which property owners leased out the mineral
rights for their separate tracts.10 The first lease was issued by the Tribe in
1984 under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, for the exploration
and development of oil and gas.11 The lease was approved by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, and under 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b), BLM had the right to
inspect the wells on site because the land belonged to the Tribe.12 The two
remaining tracts were leased to Maralex and SG Interests III, Ltd. (“SG”);
one was leased collectively by the three families, and one was leased
individually by the O’Hares.13
In 1996, Plaintiffs, SG, and the Tribe entered into a
communitization agreement (“CA”) which stated that the production of
minerals produced would be allocated to the interest owners in proportion
to the amount of property owned.14 This agreement stated the parties had
agreed “that the Secretary of the Interior, or [their] duly Authorized
Officer” would supervise the oil and gas production.15 The CA’s language
was used in conjunction with FOGRMA, which authorizes representatives
to enter the lease sites without advanced notice for lease site inspections
on federal and Indian lands.16 BLM interpreted this language to mean it
can supervise and inspect the wells—even those on private land—to
ensure proper security and measure production.17
Maralex controlled four oil wells located on two tracts from leases
on the O’Hares’ private property.18 BLM wished to conduct site
inspections on the wells and contacted Maralex and the O’Hares for
property access, which was denied.19 BLM then issued four Notices of
Incidents of Noncompliance (“INC”) because Maralex and the O’Hares
declined to “‘permit properly identified authorized representatives’. . . ‘to
enter upon, travel across and inspect lease sites . . . without advance
notice.’”20 Maralex and the O’Hares appealed the INCs and sent a letter to
BLM arguing it only had authority to conduct annual inspections of their
wells.21 They argued that BLM’s request to have a key to freely access
their private property was beyond the authority of BLM and violated their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.22 In August 2013, BLM’s Deputy
State Director for Energy, Lands, and Minerals, Colorado State Office,
10.
11.
12.
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14.
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20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1192–93.
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1193 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b)).
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Id. at 1200 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b)).
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1193–94.
Id. at 1194 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3162.1(b)).
Id.
Id.
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reviewed the letter and promulgated a point-by-point response disagreeing
with Maralex’s annual inspections arguments.23
After receiving the response letter from BLM, Maralex appealed
the BLM decision to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”), which
affirmed the INCs.24 Plaintiffs then brought suit in district court because
the IBLA failed to address the issues of whether BLM can require a key
to gate locks.25 The district court affirmed the IBLA decision, allowing
BLM to access the lease sites without advanced notice.26 The decisions of
the BLM State Director, IBLA, and the district court each failed to address
whether BLM can require the land owners or well operators to provide a
key to access lease site gates or if BLM can use its own lock on the gates.27
III. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the extent of BLM authority by
evaluating the plain language of the statute and the proper deference owed
when the statute is silent or ambiguous.28 Two additional issues in this
appeal were: (1) whether Plaintiffs waived their argument that BLM
lacked authority to access lease sites, and requiring Plaintiffs to give BLM
a gate key or allow it to place its own lock for immediate access was
proper; and (2) whether BLM had authority via statutes and regulations to
require Plaintiffs to supply BLM with a key or lock for unfettered access
to lease sites.29
A. Chevron and Waiver of Claims
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court decision by applying
the test from Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, and found
no ambiguity in the applicable statute’s language, thereby declining to
defer to the agency’s decision and instead following the statute’s express
intent.30 The Tenth Circuit then addressed whether Plaintiffs waived their
argument that BLM lacked authority to immediately access private
property, either by a key to locked gates or by placing a BLM lock on the
gates.31 Because this argument was not specifically addressed in Plaintiffs’
initial appeals of the INCs, the district court declined to analyze the issue.32
The Tenth Circuit looked at both the IBLA briefs and the CA, which both
deny that BLM has unbridled and unlimited access to conduct inspections
23.
24.
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26.
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Id. at 1194–95 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 101(b)).
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1199–1200.
Id. at 1195–96.
Id. at 1198–99 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
Id. at 1196.
Id.
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without notice.33 An order was issued to show cause to whether BLM
would continue to seek access, and the BLM confirmed they would.34
B. BLM Authority
BLM interpreted FOGRMA and the CA as the source of its
authority to inspect lease sites.35 FOGRMA states:
Authorized and properly identified representatives of the
Secretary may without advanced notice, enter upon, travel
across and inspect lease sites on Federal or Indian Lands
and may obtain from the operator immediate access to
secured facilities on such lease sites, for the purpose of
making any inspection or investigation for determining
whether there is compliance with the requirements of the
mineral leasing laws and this Act.36
FOGRMA gives authority to BLM to inspect the federal or tribal lands.37
The CA provides that the Secretary of the Interior, or authorized officer
shall have the right to inspect “all operations within the Communitized
Area” to the same extent that the Tribe is a lessee governed and regulated
by the Department of the Interior.38
The Tenth Circuit found that authorized representatives of the
Secretary may conduct inspections of a lease site without advanced notice,
but authority needs to be specified to do this on private land.39 Because
FOGRMA was silent to the authority given to access privately held land,
statutory directives in 43 C.F.R. § 3161 were used to interpret BLM
authority to access property.40 The Tenth Circuit cited the regulations that
stated agencies have the authority to inspect “all wells and facilities on
State or privately owned lands committed to a unit or communitization
agreement, which include Federal or Indian lease interests.”41 The CA was
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, and allows annual inspections
when the applicable wells are producing in significant quantities, or when
sites have a history of noncompliance with federal law.42
The Tenth Circuit found that the authority to conduct annual
inspections does not construct a limitation, but only a minimum for
allowed inspections; therefore, BLM had authority to inspect the wells

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1200.
Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1718(b)).
Id.
Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1201–02 (citing 43 C.F.R.§ 3161.3).
Id. at 1201.
Id. (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3161.1(b)).
Id. (citing 43 C.F.R. § 3161.3(a)).
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without prior authorization.43 Using the language of the regulations, a
property owner or operator is not required to supply a key to access a lease
site on private land, or to allow BLM to install its own lock on a gate.44
However, when the lease site is on privately-owned lands, BLM must first
seek entry from the land owner or well operator to afford them entry to
conduct lease inspections.45
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the
extent of BLM’s authority to access private property and held BLM has
the authority to access private property. However, courts must balance the
interests of private property owners against government interests. This
holding required BLM to get entry approval to access private property
lease sites. Without this holding, BLM would have interpreted its own
authority to extend to practically unfettered access to private property in
order to conduct inspections when federal or Indian land is involved with
the lease.

43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1203 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1204 (citing 30 C.F.R. §§ 3163.1(a)(5), 3163.3).
Id.

